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NAACP v. TOWN OF HARRISON: APPLYING TITLE VII
DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS TO MUNICIPAL
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)I prohibits dis-
criminatory employment practices based on race, color, religion, sex or
national origin.2 Title VII prohibits intentionally discriminatory em-
ployment practices as well as practices that are facially neutral but dis-
criminatory in operation. 3 Courts have developed two theories of
employer liability under Title VII: "disparate treatment" and "disparate
impact."' 4 Courts apply disparate treatment analysis to claims of inten-
tional employment discrimination, and disparate impact analysis to
facially neutral but dicriminatory employment practices. 5 A plaintiff
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988)).
2. Id. Title VII provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
3. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The Griggs Court
specifically stated that "[Title VII] proscribes not only overt discrimination but
also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." Id.
4. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (ad-
dressing claim made by black civil rights activist that employment discharge was
racially motivated and violated Title VII), vacating 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972);
Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (analyzing black employee's Title VII challenge to em-
ployer's requirement of high school education or passing of intelligence tests as
prerequisite for employment or transfer to other positions).
5. See generally BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAw 13-22 & 80-201 (2d ed. 1983) (offering basic discussion of
distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact); MICHAELJ. ZIM-
MER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 39-308 (2d
ed. 1988) (providing pertinent case law and commentary on Title VII theories of
disparate treatment and disparate impact); Anita M. Alessandra, Comment,
When Doctrines Collide: Disparate Treatment, Disparate Impact, And Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1755, 1757-62 (1989) (providing over-
view of disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of liability).
Employment practices that intentionally discriminate are analyzed under
the "disparate treatment" theory of liability. For the evolution of this theory
and the allocation of burdens and order of proof in a disparate treatment claim,
(409)
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may premise an employment discrimination claim under either or both
theories of liability, and a court may use either theory in arriving at its
decision.
6
In NAACP v. Town of Harrison,7 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reviewed a New Jersey district court finding of em-
ployment discrimination under the disparate impact theory of liability.
8
The plaintiffs, the Newark, New Jersey branch of the National Associa-
see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-55 (1981)
(addressing female employee's Title VII claim of employment termination based
on gender discrimination); see also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977) (contending in Title VII suit that employer
conducted pattern of discrimination against blacks and Spanish-surnamed per-
sons); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 303-13 (1977) (alleg-
ing that Hazelwood, Missouri school district violated Title VII by engaging in
"pattern or practice" of teacher employment discrimination); McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 805 n.18. In Teamsters, the Court stated: " 'Disparate treatment'...
is the most easily understood type of discrimination.... Proof of discriminatory
motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere
fact of differences in treatment." For a discussion of the disparate treatment
theory of liability, see infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
Employment practices that do not have a discriminatory motive but are
functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination are analyzed under the
"disparate impact" theory of liability. For the development of this theory, see
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 646-61 (1989) (addressing
disparate impact claim of nonwhite cannery workers that salmon packing com-
pany's facially neutral hiring practices produced racial stratification in workplace
and denied noncannery positions based on race); see also Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986-1000 (1988) (applying disparate impact analy-
sis to subjective promotion system in suit by black employee denied promotion
in favor of white applicants); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-56 (1982)
(considering black state employees' claim of disparate impact resulting from re-
quirement that employees pass neutral written examination before promotion);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-37 (1977) (addressing claim of dispa-
rate impact by female denied position as prison guard for failing to meet height
and weight requirements); Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 328-37 (discussing application
of disparate impact theory to practices that perpetuate effects of prior discrimi-
nation); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136-37 (1976) (alleging dis-
parate impact in class action based on employer's neutral disability plan that did
not include pregnancy as insurable disability); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 246-47 (1976) (considering disparate impact claim made by two blacks re-
jected for positions as police officers because of allegedly discriminatory hiring
procedures); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (treating
disparate impact claim of black employees that company's neutral employment
practices, seniority system and backpay issue violated Title VII); Griggs, 401 U.S.
at 431. For a discussion of the disparate impact theory of liability, see infra notes
38-52 & 53-71 and accompanying text.
6. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n. 15. After a thorough discussion of both
theories of liability, the Teamsters Court stated, "Either theory may, of course, be
applied to a particular set of facts." Id.
7. 940 F.2d 792 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'g NAACP v. Town of Harrison, 749 F.
Supp. 1327 (D.N.J. 1990).
8. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 792. The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Jersey concluded that the plaintiffs successfully established a claim
of disparate impact employment discrimination. Harrison, 749 F. Supp. at 1342-
43.
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tion for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP),9 charged that
the Town of Harrison, New Jersey engaged in discriminatory employ-
ment practices against NAACP members.' 0 Specifically, the NAACP
challenged Harrison's enactment of a residency requirement for uni-
formed and nonuniformed municipal employment." I The United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey concluded that the resi-
dency ordinance effected a disparate impact on minority groups in adja-
cent communities who sought employment in Harrison.' 2
In Harrison, the Third Circuit examined the NAACP's claim of dis-
parate impact in light of the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio. 13 The Third Circuit utilized the
Supreme Court's definition of the "relevant labor market" in Wards Cove
to affirm the district court's holding that the NAACP had established a
prima facie case of disparate impact. 14 The Third Circuit also affirmed
the district court's business justification analysis, concluding that the
reasons offered by the Town to justify its use of a residency requirement
failed to meet the Town's burden of production under Wards Cove. 1-
The Third Circuit's affirmance of the district court's holding is sig-
nificant for two reasons. First, residency ordinances afford a municipal-
ity a popular means of providing social and economic benefits to its
9. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 796. The NAACP is a national membership organi-
zation that seeks to secure the civil and equal employment rights of minorities.
Id. The Newark andJersey City, NewJersey branches of the NAACP were joined
on appeal by the NewJersey State Conference of the NAACP and by the NAACP
national organization. Id. at 792. In the district court, the Newark and Jersey
City branches were joined by branches from Paterson and Passaic, New Jersey.
Harrison, 749 F. Supp. at 1327.
Individual NAACP branches act through committees that promote educa-
tion, political action, legal redress and labor and industry. Id. at 1332. Through
these committees, the NAACP seeks to eliminate all forms of discrimination and
to promote the interests of blacks. Id. The efforts of the NAACP branches are
on behalf of all blacks, regardless of formal membership in a branch or the na-
tional organization. Id. Given the historical discrimination in employment op-
portunities experienced by blacks, a principal goal of the NAACP is "to
overcome employment discrimination and to enable blacks to participate in the
job market on an equal basis." Id.
10. Id. at 1328. For a discussion of the procedural history of the NAACP's
Title VII litigation, see infra note 89.
11. Harrison, 749 F. Supp. at 1328-29. For a discussion of the plaintiffs'
specific claims, see infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
12. Harrison, 749 F. Supp. at 1342-43. For a discussion of the district
court's holding, see infra note 91.
13. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 799-812; see Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642 (1989). For a discussion of Wards Cove, see infra notes 55-74 and
accompanying text.
14. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 801. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analy-
sis of the NAACP's prima facie case, see supra notes 95-101 and accompanying
text.
15. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 805. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's ap-
proach to the Town's burden of production and business justifications, see infra
notes 102-115 and accompanying text.
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residents. 16 After Harrison, the validity of these residency ordinances
may be jeopardized if they create a disparate impact on minority groups.
Second, the Third Circuit misconstrued the nature of the employer's
burden at the business justification stage of a disparate impact claim. In
interpreting Wards Cove, the Third Circuit stated that the employer's evi-
dentiary burden at the business justification stage was not clearly enun-
ciated in the case law.' 7 Unfortunately, Harrison does not contribute to a
better understanding of the scope of this burden. In sum, the Third
Circuit's holding in Harrison does not provide sufficient guidance to fu-
ture courts faced with a disparate impact claim after Wards Cove.
This Note explores the approach adopted by the Third Circuit in
Harrison, focusing specifically on the court's interpretation of Wards Cove
and its application to municipal residency requirements.' 8 Part II pro-
vides a legal framework to help understand the issues facing the Third
Circuit on appeal. 19 This framework outlines the theories of liability
that have evolved under Title VII and examines the Supreme Court's
analysis in Wards Cove.20 Part III discusses the Third Circuit's analysis in
Harrison.2 1 Part IV critiques this analysis and submits that the Third Cir-
cuit correctly affirmed the district court's holding that the NAACP had
presented a prima facie case of disparate impact.2 2 The Third Circuit,
however, misapplied the teaching of Wards Cove in rejecting the business
justifications offered by the Town for its residency requirement. 23 Part
V considers the current state of disparate impact analysis after Wards
Cove and the recent enactment by Congress of the Civil Rights Act of
1991.24
II. BACKGROUND
Title VII proscribes discriminatory employment practices based on
16. See Harrison, 940 F.2d at 804-05. For a discussion of the Town's de-
scription of these benefits, see infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
17. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 803.
18. For a discussion and critique of the Third Circuit's analysis in Harrison,
see infra notes 75-141 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of this legal framework, see infra notes 25-74 and ac-
companying text.
20. For a discussion of Title VII theories of liability, see infra notes 30-54
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's analysis in
Wards Cove, see infra notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis in Harrison, see infra
notes 75-115 and accompanying text.
22. For a critique of the Third Circuit's analysis in Harrison, see infra notes
116-41 and accompanying text. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's affirmance
of the NAACP's prima facie case, see infra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's misapplication of Wards Cove, see
infra notes 124-41 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the impact of Wards Cove and the Civil Rights Act of
1991, see infra notes 142-58 and accompanying text.
412 [Vol. 37: p. 409
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an employee's race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 25 The United
States Congress enacted Title VII in an attempt to guarantee equal em-
ployment opportunities to all persons and to eradicate discriminatory
employment practices that have disadvantaged minority groups in the
workplace. 26 As originally enacted, Title VII only applied to private em-
ployers. 2 7 The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,28 how-
ever, expanded the scope of Title VII to include state and local
governmental employers. 29
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). For the pertinent text of Title VII, see
supra note 2. Congress specifically stated that its purpose in enacting Title VII
was "to eliminate, through the utilization of formal and informal remedial pro-
cedures, discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401.
The legislative history of Title VII illustrates that Congress, in enacting the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, intended to insure that "men and women shall be em-
ployed on the basis of their qualifications, not as Catholic citizens, not as Protes-
tant citizens, not as Jewish citizens, not as colored citizens, but as citizens of the
United States." 110 CONG. REC. 13088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
26. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973). In
McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court noted that Congress enacted Title VII "to
assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discrimina-
tory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environ-
ments to the disadvantage of minority citizens." Id. The Court also noted that
"[t]he broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer,
is efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially neu-
tral employment and personnel decisions. In the implementation of such deci-
sions, it is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination,
subtle or otherwise." Id. at 801.
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)
(1988)); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 304 n.7 (1977).
28. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988)).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (Supp. 11 1972) (current version at 42 U.S.C
§ 2000e(a) (1988)); H.R. REP. No. 92-238 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2137, 2152. The 1972 amendment, which broadened the definition of "person"
to include state and local government units, represented a significant expansion
of the scope of Title VII. See id. When the 1972 amendment was passed, ap-
proximately 10.1 million people were employed by state and local governments,
an increase of over two million employees since Title VII was enacted in 1964.
Id. Furthermore, the legislative history of the 1972 amendment to Title VII
demonstrates that Congress recognized and subscribed to the disparate impact
theory of liability. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 n.8 (1982). Delet-
ing the exemption for state and municipal employers confirmed Congress' in-
tention to provide state and municipal employees with the same equality of
opportunity as private employees and to eliminate the discriminatory barriers
that the private market had erected since the enactment of Title VII. Id.
In addition, prior to 1972, Title VII's definition of "employer" applied only
to those companies having twenty-five or more employees. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988)); H.R. REP.
No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2402.
The 1972 amendment to Title VII expanded its application to employers having
15 or more employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. 11 1972) (current ver-
sion at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988)).
19921 NOTE 413
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A. Title VII Theories of Liability
Title VII permits plaintiffs to demonstrate employment discrimina-
tion under two theories of liability: disparate treatment and disparate
impact. 30 Plaintiffs alleging disparate treatment under Title VII focus
on the employer's discriminatory intent.s 1 In addressing claims of dis-
parate treatment, courts have developed a series of shifting evidentiary
burdens designed to clarify the factual questions surrounding an em-
ployee's claim of alleged intentional discrimination. 32
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,33 the Supreme Court, in consid-
ering an employee's claim of intentional discrimination, established the
criteria for proving the first of these evidentiary burdens, the plaintiff's
prima facie case.34 The Court declared that the plaintiff bears the bur-
30. See generally ZIMMER, supra note 5, at 40 (dividing disparate treatment
model into individual and systemic disparate treatment to form three theories of
liability under Title VII); Alessandra, Comment, supra note 5, at 1757-62 (pro-
viding overview of disparate treatment and disparate impact models).
31. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977). In an oft-cited footnote in Teamsters, the Court declared that the central
issue in a disparate treatment case is whether "[t]he employer simply treats
some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in
some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment." Id.
at 335 n.15.
32. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8
(1981). The Burdine Court specifically stated: "[T]he allocation of burdens and
the creation of a presumption by the establishment of a prima facie case is in-
tended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of
intentional discrimination." Id.
33. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
34. Id. at 802. In McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff, Percy Green, a McDonnell
Douglas employee who was also a civil rights activist, was laid off by McDonnell
Douglas, an aerospace and aircraft manufacturer, as part of a general reduction
in its work force. Id. at 794. Green protested that his discharge was racially
motivated. Id. His protests included participating in a "stall-in" and "lock-in"
to demonstrate opposition to his dismissal and to the general employment poli-
cies of McDonnell Douglas. Id. at 794-95. McDonnell Douglas claimed that its
refusal to rehire Green upon reapplication stemmed from Green's unlawful ac-
tivities in protesting the initial discharge. Id. at 801.
Attempting to settle the confusion in the Eighth Circuit regarding the shift-
ing of burdens in a Title VII disparate treatment case, the Court stated:
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden
under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimina-
tion. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial mi-
nority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802. The Court further noted that "[tihe facts necessarily will vary in Title
VII cases, and the specification . . .of the prima facie proof required from [a
plaintiff] is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situa-
tions." Id. at 802 n.13.
In Burdine, the Court declared that a plaintiff's demonstration of a prima
[Vol. 37: p. 409414
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den of establishing a prima facie case of intentional discrimination.3 5
Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden then
shifts to the employer to enunciate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son for the challenged practice.3 6 The Court stated that if the employer
meets this burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that
the employer's justification is, in fact, a pretext for discrimination.3 7
Plaintiffs alleging disparate impact need not focus on the em-
ployer's discriminatory intent.3 8 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,39 the
Supreme Court established the disparate impact theory of liability in
employment discrimination. 40 The Court stated that Title VII prohibits
facie case created a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated
against the employee. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. The Court stated that "[i]f the
trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence, and if the employer is silent in the
face of the presumption, the court must enter the judgment for the plaintiff be-
cause no issue of fact remains in the case." Id.; see also Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (instructing that prima facie case "raises an
inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise un-
explained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible
factors"); Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358-59 & n.44 (noting that plaintiffs established
prima facie case of disparate treatment by demonstrating existence of discrimi-
natory hiring "pattern and practice").
35. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
36. Id. The McDonnell Douglas Court concluded that in asserting that Green
participated in unlawful conduct, McDonnell Douglas adequately discharged its
burden of proof in rebutting Green's prima facie case. Id. at 803; see also Burdine,
450 U.S. at 252-55 (stating that employer, in rebutting plaintiff's prima facie
case, bore burden of production in offering nondiscriminatory basis for chal-
lenged practice).
37. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. The McDonnell Douglas Court re-
manded the case for a determination of the pretext issue. Id. at 807; see also
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (stating that plaintiff may establish pretextual employ-
ment practice directly by persuading court that employer was motivated by dis-
criminatory intent or indirectly by demonstrating that employer's proposed
explanation lacked credence); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975) (declaring that pretextual discrimination existed if plaintiff demonstrated
that other practices served employer's goals without undesirable discriminatory
effect).
38. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15, 349 (asserting that disparate impact
claims involve employment practices that, while facially neutral, affect one group
more harshly than another); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136-37
(1976) (citing Supreme Court cases illustrating disparate impact analysis); Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-47 (1976); Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 425;
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.14.
39. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
40. Id. at 431. In Griggs, black employees at the Duke Power Company's
generating plant brought suit to challenge the requirement of a high school di-
ploma or the passing of standardized intelligence tests as a condition of employ-
ment or transfer within the plant. Id. at 425-26. The Court stated that neither
requirement was significantly related to successful job performance. Id. at 426.
The requirements, however, disqualified black applicants more often than white
applicants. Id. The Court further stated that in the past, only white persons had
held the jobs at issue, evidencing an established practice of giving preference to
white persons. Id.
7
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not only intentional discrimination, but also facially neutral employment
practices that perpetuate discrimination. 4' Subsequently, the Supreme
Court has held that disparate impact analysis hinges on the premise that
even if employment practices do not discriminate purposefully, these
practices, when implemented, may be functionally identical to inten-
tional discrimination. 42 The Court, however, has not demanded proof
of intentional discrimination, for disparate impact analysis focuses on
the consequences of an employer's practice, not on an employer's
motive.43
Disparate impact analysis generally implements the same shifting
evidentiary burdens applied in a disparate treatment claim.4 4 A plaintiff
alleging disparate impact bears the initial burden of establishing a prima
facie case. To prove a prima facie case of disparate impact, a plaintiff
must show that an employer's facially neutral employment practice pro-
duced a discriminatory hiring pattern.4 5 A plaintiff often utilizes statisti-
cal comparisons to gauge the effect of a specific employment practice on
a particular group.46 A plaintiff's choice of a particular statistical com-
41. Id. at 431. The Griggs Court held that Title VII "proscribes not only
overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation." Id.
42. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988)
("[S]ome employment practices, adopted without a deliberately discriminatory
motive, may in operation be functionally equivalent to intentional
discrimination.").
43. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. The Griggs Court declared that "good intent or
absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or
testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and
are unrelated to measuring job capability." Id.
44. Compare Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
253-56 (1981) and Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309-13
(1977) and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)
(each utilizing shifting evidentiary burdens in disparate treatment cases) with
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-61 (1989) and Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-99 (1988) and Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 433 U.S. 321, 329-37 (1977) (each employing shifting evidentiary burdens
in disparate impact cases). For a discussion of the shifting evidentiary burdens
in a disparate impact claim, see infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
45. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 994 (noting that plaintiff must "isolat[e] and
identifly] the specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for
any observed statistical disparities); Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329-31 (stating that
plaintiff must demonstrate that facially neutral employment practices result in
significantly discriminatory hiring pattern); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (concluding that Griggs burden of business necessity arises
only after plaintiff has established prima facie case of discrimination by showing
that employment practice selects applicants in pattern significantly different
from pool of applicants).
46. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-
40 & n.20 (1977) (stating that statistical proof may be used by Court to demon-
strate employment discrimination). See generally Andrea R. Waintroob, The Devel-
oping Law of Equal Employment Opportunity at the White Collar and Professional Level,
21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 45, 69-86; Alessandra, Comment, supra note 5, at 1760.
Alessandra and Waintroob outline the three types of statistical comparisons ac-
[Vol. 37: p. 409416
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parison often is crucial to determine whether the plaintiff has presented
a significant statistical disparity to establish a prima facie case of dispa-
rate impact.4 7 The Supreme Court has stated that the appropriate sta-
tistical inquiry in a disparate impact case compares the percentage of
individuals in an employer's work force belonging to the affected group
with the percentage of that affected group in the relevant labor
market.4
8
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of disparate im-
knowledged by the Supreme Court for gauging the impact of an employer's
practice on a particular group. "General population statistics" compare the per-
centage of protected group members adversely affected by an employment prac-
tice with the percentage of nonprotected individuals similarly affected. See
Waintroob, supra, at 69-70; Alessandra, Comment, supra note 5, at 1760. For
examples of the Court's use of general population statistics in a disparate impact
claim, see Dothard, 433 U.S. at 330 (relying on generalized national statistics in
addressing claim of discriminatory minimum height and weight requirements);
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 337 n.17 (relying on statistical disparity between racial
composition of Teamsters line drivers and racial composition of city and metro-
politan area surrounding Teamsters terminals); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 n.6 (rely-
ing on 1960 U.S. census that indicated statistical disparity between black and
white males receiving high school diplomas). Comparisons to the general popu-
lation are often used when many persons possess the job skill at issue or when
the skill can readily be acquired. See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308 n.13 (comparing
job skill of truck driving in Teamsters with teaching in Hazelwood). When specific
qualifications are required, comparisons to the general population may have
minimal value.
"Applicant flow data," the second type of statistical comparison acknowl-
edged by the Court, compares the minority composition of a pool of applicants
with the composition of those actually employed. See Waintroob, supra, at 81-82;
Alessandra, Comment, supra note 5, at 1760. Albemarle Paper is an example of the
use of such data in addressing a claim of disparate impact. See Albemarle Paper,
422 U.S. at 425 (comparing racial composition of applicants for hire or promo-
tion with racial composition of pool of applicants). The third type of statistical
comparison, "available workforce statistics," compares the percentage of a pro-
tected group in the relevant labor market with the percentage of that group em-
ployed by a particular employer. See Waintroob, supra, at 76-77; Alessandra,
Comment, supra note 5, at 1760. Alessandra defines the relevant labor market as
"those individuals having the requisite skills for the job." Id. at 1760. For an
example of the use of available workforce statistics in a disparate impact claim,
see infra note 48 and accompanying text.
47. Alessandra, Comment, supra note 5, at 1760.
48. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308. The Hazelwood Court adopted available
workforce statistics as its statistical comparison. Id. at 308 n. 13. These statistics
compared the racial composition of the school district's teaching staff with the
racial composition of the qualified teacher population in the relevant labor mar-
ket. Id. at 308. This comparison is especially effective when the job skill at issue
requires special qualifications. Id. at 308 n.13.
In Hazelwood, the government alleged that the Hazelwood School District,
located in suburban St. Louis County, Missouri, engaged in teacher employment
discrimination. The Court noted that statistical disparities alone, in the proper
circumstances, may constitute a prima facie case. Id. at 307-08 (citing Teamsters,
431 U.S. at 339); see also Watson, 487 U.S. at 987 ("The evidence in these 'dispa-
rate impact' cases usually focuses on statistical disparities, rather than specific
incidents, and on competing explanations for those disparities.").
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pact, the burden shifts to the employer to justify the continued use of
the challenged practice.4 9 In Griggs, the "touchstone" for determining if
the employer had met its burden of proof was "business necessity."
'50
The Griggs Court concluded that an employment practice is justified by
business necessity if it bears a "manifest relationship to the employment
at issue.""1 Subsequently, the Court has held that an employer attempt-
ing to justify an allegedly discriminatory employment practice must ex-
plain each component of the challenged practice and may not rely on its
overall nondiscriminatory effect. 52 Thus, an employer may not adopt a
"bottom line" defense to a charge of disparate impact.
53
If an employer successfully rebuts a plaintiff's prima facie case by
justifying the challenged employment practice, a plaintiff nevertheless
may prevail by demonstrating that the challenged practice serves as a
49. See Watson, 487 U.S. 994-95 ("[T]he plaintiff must offer statistical evi-
dence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has
caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of the their
membership in a protected group."); Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329 (holding that em-
ployer must meet Griggs burden of "manifest relationship to employment in
question"); Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 426 (concluding that employer must
meet burden of proving that employment practice is sufficiently "job related").
50. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). In Griggs, the Court
stated that "[i]f an employment practice which operates to exclude [blacks] can-
not be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Id.
Therefore, the Court invalidated Duke Power's requirement of a high school
diploma as well as the passing of a standardized general intelligence test. Id. at
432. The Court held that Congress, in enacting Title VII, required "the removal
of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification." Id. at 431; see also Albernarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 431 (holding that
discriminatory tests must have relevance to elements of work behavior applica-
ble to employment at issue); SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 103-07.
51. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. The business necessity standard differentiates
liability under a theory of disparate treatment from one of disparate impact. In a
disparate treatment claim, the employer's burden is one of production. See
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (hold-
ing that employer need only produce legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
challenged practice). In establishing the business necessity standard as the em-
ployer's burden in a disparate impact claim, the Griggs Court required the em-
ployer to bear the burden of proof, including the burdens of production and
persuasion. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. This burden could be satisfied by proving
that the challenged practice was justified by business necessity. Id.
52. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 452-56 (1982). In Teal, the plaintiffs
challenged a written test requirement for promotion to welfare supervisor in
Connecticut. Id. at 444. Statistics demonstrated that while more whites than
blacks passed the test, blacks received promotion more often than whites. Id.
The Court stated that "[t]he suggestion that disparate impact should be mea-
sured only at the bottom line ignores the fact that Title VII guarantees these
individual respondents the opportunity to compete equally with white workers on
the basis of job-related criteria." Id. at 451.
53. Id. at 456; see also Alessandra, Comment, supra note 5, at 1761 (stating
that after Teal, disparate impact analysis measures effect of each component of em-
ployer's practice and, therefore, a "racially balanced 'bottom line' will not
suffice").
418
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pretext for discrimination, or that an alternative practice would accom-
plish the employer's goals without the same discriminatory effect. 54
B. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio: A Disparate Impact Claim
In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,5 5 the Supreme Court faced a
claim of employment discrimination based on the disparate impact the-
ory of liability. The plaintiffs, a class of nonwhite cannery workers in the
Alaska salmon industry, alleged that Wards Cove, a salmon packing
company, discriminated in its hiring and promotion procedures. 56 The
plaintiffs claimed that these practices produced a disparate impact on
cannery workers by denying them noncannery positions on the basis of
race in violation of Title VII. 5 7 After an en banc panel of the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that the cannery workers had established a prima facie
case of disparate impact, the Supreme Court granted certiorari5 8 to ad-
54. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 998 (quoting Albemarle Paper for plaintiff's bur-
den to show alternative and less discriminatory employment practice). In Al-
bemarle Paper, the Court stated:
If an employer does . .. meet the burden of proving that its tests are
"job related," it remains open to the complaining party to show that
other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial
effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in "efficient
and trustworthy workmanship."
Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 425 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). In Griggs, the pretext issue did not arise because the
Court concluded that neither of the employer's challenged employment prac-
tices bore a demonstrable relationship to successful job performance. Griggs,
401 U.S. at 431.
55. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
56. Id. at 647-48. The salmon industry in Alaska operates during the sum-
mer months only, beginning in May orJune of each year. Id. at 646. Two types
of occupations existed at the canneries: "cannery jobs," which were unskilled
positions on the cannery line, and "noncannery jobs," which were skilled posi-
tions such as machinists, engineers, quality control personnel and support staff.
Id. at 647 & n.3. Most cannery jobs were filled by Filipinos and native Alaskans.
Id. at 647. The majority of noncannery positions were filled by whites hired
during the off-season. Id. Noncannery workers generally received greater com-
pensation than their cannery line counterparts. Id.
57. Id. at 647-48. The cannery workers alleged a variety of discriminatory
practices, "including nepotism, a rehire preference, a lack of objective hiring
criteria, separate hiring channels [and] a practice of not promoting from
within." Id. at 647. The cannery workers also protested Wards Cove's racially
segregated housing and dining facilities. Id. at 648. Due to the location and
intensity of the salmon canning season, all employees lived and ate at the can-
neries. Id. at 646-47.
The cannery workers alleged both disparate treatment and disparate impact
in stating their Title VII claim. Id. at 648. The Court dismissed the disparate
treatment suit, citing the unanimous opinion of the lower courts that the can-
nery workers did not prove intentional racial discrimination. Id. at 649 n.4.
Contra id. at 663-64 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (declaring that "[s]ome charac-
teristics of the Alaska salmon industry . . . bear an unsettling resemblance to
aspects of a plantation economy").
58. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 487 U.S. 1232 (1988). After an un-
11
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dress several disputed issues concerning the proper analysis of a Title
VII disparate impact claim.5 9
The Wards Cove Court began its analysis by scrutinizing the prima
facie case presented by the cannery workers. 60 In concluding that the
cannery workers had failed to establish a prima facie case, the Court
specified the appropriate statistical comparison to be utilized in dispa-
rate impact cases. 6 1 The Court stated that the correct statistical analysis
compares the racial composition of those qualified persons in the labor
market with those persons currently employed in the job at issue.6 2 Be-
published district court judgment in favor of Wards Cove for lack ofjurisdiction,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dimissal in part and reversed in part. Atonio v.
Wards Cove Packing Co., 703 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 786 F.2d
1120, 1133 (9th Cir.), vacated, 787 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1985). On appeal after the
remand, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, then vacated its decision in order to hear the
case en banc. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120, 1133 (9th
Cir.), vacated, 787 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1985). The en banc hearing confirmed that
disparate impact analysis could be applied to subjective employment criteria, but
remanded the case to a panel for further proceedings. Atonio v. Wards Cove
Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1486 (9th Cir. 1987). On remand, the panel con-
cluded that the cannery workers had established a prima facie case of disparate
impact, but remanded the case to the district court to determine the sufficiency
of the employer's business necessity for the challenged employment practices.
Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 827 F.2d 439, 442-43 (9th Cir. 1987). The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment of the en banc panel
of the Ninth Circuit. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 487 U.S. 1232 (1988).
59. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 649-50. The Court stated that certiorari was
granted "[b]ecause some of the issues raised by the decision below were matters
on which this Court was evenly divided in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust." Id.
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust concerned the use of subjective hiring practices
in a disparate impact case. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S.
977, 984-85 (1988) (addressing black employee's Title VII claim of disparate
impact in promotion policies of bank that had not developed objective selection
criteria).
60. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650-55.
61. Id. at 650-52.
62. Id. This comparison corresponds to the available work force statistic
described in Alessandra, Comment, supra note 5, at 1760. For a definition and
discussion of this statistical comparison, see supra note 46. The Wards Cove
Court recognized the use of other statistical comparisons in the event labor mar-
ket statistics are difficult to obtain, such as those indicating the race of "other-
wise-qualified applicants" for the jobs. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 651.
The Wards Cove Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's statistical comparison of
the racial composition of the cannery work force to the racial composition of the
noncannery work force. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 651. The Court stated that such
a comparison, even if it illustrated great disparity, failed to measure the relevant
labor market, or in the words of the Wards Cove Court, the "qualified population
in the labor force." Id. at 651. The Court reasoned that if it had adopted the
Ninth Circuit's comparison, any employer confronted with a racially imbalanced
work force, for whatever reason, could be haled into court under a claim of dis-
parate impact. Id. at 653. The Court further stated that employers would thus
be forced to adopt quotas in order to maintain racial balance among the seg-
ments of its work force. Id. The Court concluded that such quotas would con-
travene Congress' express intent in drafting Title VII. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(j) (1988).
420
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cause the Ninth Circuit had used an incorrect statistical comparison, the
Court held that the cannery workers did not establish a prima facie case
of disparate impact.63 Having remanded the case for further proceed-
ings, however, the Court proceeded to consider the additional chal-
lenges to the Ninth Circuit's holding. 64
The Wards Cove Court first examined the issue of causation in a
claim of disparate impact.6 5 The Court declared that a plaintiff alleging
disparate impact must identify the specific employment practice that
produced the alleged discrimination. 6 6 Having identified the specific
practice at issue, the Court stated that the plaintiff may then offer statis-
tical evidence to prove causation.6 7
The Court discussed the nature of the burden that shifts to an em-
ployer after a plaintiff has established a prima facie case.68 At this justifi-
cation stage of a disparate impact claim, the Court stated that "the
dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant
63. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 655. Having found no prima facie case, the
Court stated that any further analysis of causation or business justification was
premature. Id. The Court remanded the proceeding to determine if a prima
facie case could be established on another statistical basis. Id.
64. Id. The Court stated: "Because we remand for further proceedings,
however, on whether a prima facie case of disparate impact has been made in
this case, we address [additional] challenges petitioners have made to the deci-
sion of the [Ninth Circuit]." Id.
65. Id. at 656.
66. Id. at 656-57 (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,
994 (1988)). In Watson, the Court addressed whether disparate impact analysis
applied to a bank's hiring or promotion practices that utilized "discretionary" or
"subjective" employment criteria. Watson, 487 U.S. at 989. In analyzing the
causation issue, the Court enunciated the plaintiff's burden to establish a prima
facie case of disparate impact:
The plaintiff must begin by identifying the specific employment prac-
tice that is challenged .... Especially in cases where an employer com-
bines subjective criteria with the use of more rigid standardized rules or
tests, the plaintiff is , . .responsible for isolating and identifying the
specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any ob-
served statistical disparities.
Id. (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982)).
67. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656. The Wards Cove Court stated:
Just as an employer cannot escape liability under Title VII by demon-
strating that, "at the bottom line," his work force is racially balanced
... a Title VII plaintiff does not make out a case of disparate impact
simply by showing that, "at the bottom line," there is racial imbalance
in the work force.
Id. at 656-57. The Court thus confirmed its earlier rejection of the "bottom
line" defense to claims of disparate impact. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.
440, 450 (1982) (asserting that Title VII disparate impact analysis focuses on
impact of particular hiring practices on minority employment opportunities and
not simply on bottom line employment numbers).
68. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 658. The Court described this burden as com-
prised of two elements: the justifications offered by the employer for using the
challenged practice, and the availability of alternative, nondiscriminatory prac-
tices to accomplish the same goals. Id.
19921 NOTE
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way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer."'6 9 The "touch-
stone" of this analysis entails a reasoned review of the employer's justifi-
cation for using the challenged practice. 70 This standard differs from
the prior "touchstone" of business necessity defined by the Court in
Griggs.
7 1
The Wards Cove Court distinguished between the evidentiary bur-
dens of production and persuasion in a disparate impact claim. 72
Although the employer bears the burden of producing evidence of a
business justification for the challenged practice, the Court declared that
the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff at all times. 73 Fi-
nally, the Court stated that the plaintiff still could prevail if he or she
persuades the Court that the employer's business justification serves as a
pretext for discrimination. 74
69. Id. at 659 (citing Watson, 487 U.S. at 997-99; New York City Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
70. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659. The Court found that this review required
more than articulating an insubstantial justification, but did not require that the
challenged practice be "essential" or "indispensable" to the employer's busi-
ness. Id. Contra Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (holding that at business justification
stage of disparate impact case, employer bears burden of production and per-
suasion in demonstrating "touchstone" of business necessity). See generally
Linda M. Mealey, Note, English Only Rules and "Innocent" Employers: Clarifying Na-
tional Origin Discrimination and Disparate Impact Theory under Title VII, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 387, 417 (1989) (stating that Wards Cove burden requiring reasoned review
was considerably more lenient than burden of business necessity).
71. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 423. For a discussion of the Griggs standard, see
supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
72. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
73. Id. The Wards Cove Court stated that "[tihe ultimate burden of proving
that discrimination against a protected group has been caused by a specific em-
ployment practice remains with the plaintiff at all times." Id. (quoting Watson,
487 U.S. at 997). The Wards Cove Court recognized "that some of our earlier
decisions can be read as suggesting otherwise." Id. at 660 (citing Watson, 487
U.S. at 1006-08 (Blackmun, J., concurring)). The Court stated that its analytical
framework conformed with the usual method of allocating the burden of persua-
sion and production in federal courts, and also conformed with the approach
adopted in disparate treatment cases. Id. at 659-60 (citing FED. R. EvIv. 301); see
also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256-58 (1981).
The Wards Cove Court stated that the plaintiff retained the burden of persuasion
in a disparate impact case because he or she must prove that employment was
denied because of race, color, religion or national origin. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1988).
74. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660; see also Watson, 487 U.S. at 998; Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). The Wards Cove Court held that
an employer's refusal to adopt less discriminatory alternatives would disprove a
claim that the employment practices did not discriminate. Wards Cove, 490 U.S.
at 661. The Court recognized that the cost effectiveness of the alternative prac-
tice was important in determining whether it would accomplish the employer's
goals. Id.
422 [Vol. 37: p. 409
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III. NAACP v. TOWN OF HARRISON
In NAACP v. Town of Harrison,75 the Third Circuit considered
whether the Town of Harrison, New Jersey violated Title VII in enacting
and enforcing a municipal residency ordinance as a prerequisite for mu-
nicipal employment. 76 The NAACP alleged that the Town's employ-
ment practices created a disparate impact on NAACP members who
wished to obtain municipal employment in Harrison. 77 In evaluating
the NAACP's claim, the Third Circuit applied the Supreme Court's
holding in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio to determine the validity of
Harrison's municipal residency requirement. 78
For many years, the Town of Harrison had adhered to a general
policy that permitted only Town residents to apply for municipal em-
ployment. 79 In 1978, the New Jersey legislature codified this general
policy by enacting the New Jersey Act Concerning Residence Require-
ments for Municipal and County Employees (the Residence Act).80 The
75. 940 F.2d 792 (3d Cir. 1991).
76. Id. at 794. For the pertinent text of Title VII, see supra note 2. The
Town of Harrison raised three principal claims of error on appeal from the dis-
trict court. Id. at 796-97. First, the Town asserted that the district court's re-
strictive definition of the relevant labor market erroneously permitted the
NAACP to establish its prima facie case. Id. Second, the Town maintained that
the district court erred in rejecting the Town's business justification for its resi-
dency requirement. Id. Finally, the Town contended that the decree imposed
by the district court, which required affirmative recruitment and hiring obliga-
tions, was not narrowly tailored to redress the discriminatory effect of the resi-
dency ordinance. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 801. In addressing this aspect of the NAACP's appeal, the Third
Circuit stated that "[t]he beginning point of any business justification inquiry
must be the Supreme Court's language in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio." Id.
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's analysis of Wards Cove, see supra notes
55-74 and accompanying text.
79. NAACP v. Town of Harrison, 749 F. Supp. 1327, 1329 (D.N.J. 1990),
aff'd, 940 F.2d (3d Cir. 1991). In the district court, the Town's witnesses testi-
fied that this practice had occurred for as long as could be remembered. Id. On
one occasion, the Town of Harrison Board of Education hired a nonresident
black woman in a highly-skilled educational specialty. Id. The Town, however,
had never hired a nonresident or a black. Id.
The Town of Harrison is a small, industrial community situated in Hudson
County, NewJersey. Id. at 1331. The district court declared that Harrison was
geographically "closely aligned with immediately adjacent Essex County to the
west and could very well be considered an extension of the City of Newark which
it abuts." Id. The district court also stated that Union County to the southwest
and Bergen and Passaic Counties to the north and northwest were within easy
commuting distances of Harrison. Id.
80. Id. at 1329 (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A:9-1 to 9-175 (West 1980 &
Supp. 1992)). The Residence Act modified the New Jersey Civil Service Act (the
Civil Service Act). See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ llA:I-I to 12-6 (West Supp. 1992).
Harrison had brought its work force under the Civil Service Act in 1947. Harri-
son, 749 F. Supp. at 1329. The Civil Service Act charged the New Jersey Depart-
ment of Personnel with establishing titles in the classified service, determining
the need for competitive examinations, establishing and administering such ex-
1992] NOTE 423
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Residence Act permitted municipalities to impose a residency require-
ment upon all officers and employees of the municipality. 8 '
Pursuant to the Residence Act, Harrison adopted a local ordinance
mandating that certain officers and employees reside in the Town of
Harrison.8 2 After enacting this residency ordinance, the Town hired
employees for its municipal work force in compliance with the ordi-
aminations, establishing and administering lists of eligible applicants, and certi-
fying the highest-ranking applicants on the lists to appropriate municipal
officers. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ I1A:3-1, 4-1, 4-2, 4-4, 4-8.
81. Id. § 40A:9-1.3. Specifically, the Residence Act permits a municipality
to "require [that] . . . all officers and employees employed by the [municipality]
... be bona fide residents therein." Id. The Residence Act also authorizes a
municipality "to limit the eligibility of applicants for positions and employments
in the classified service of such [municipality] to residents of that [municipal-
ity]." Id. § 40A:9-1.4 (emphasis added). If residency is not a prerequisite to an
application, the Residence Act states that the municipality "shall require... that
all nonresidents subsequently appointed ... shall become bona fide residents of
the [municipality] within [one] year of their appointment," except as otherwise
provided in the statute. Id. § 40A:9-1.5. If a sufficient number of qualified resi-
dents do not exist for a particular position, the municipality may look to the
county in which the municipality is located, to adjacent counties, to the state as a
whole, or to any other area. Id. § 40A:9-1.6.
The scope of the Residence Act, however, is specifically limited by any judi-
cial or agency order issued to eliminate discriminatory employment practices.
Id. § 40A:9-1.10 ("Any requirements ... shall be subject to any order issued by
any court, or by any State or Federal agency pursuant to law . . . to eliminate
discrimination in employment .... ).
Police and fire department employees in NewJersey are expressly exempted
from the Residence Act. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 795 n.1 (citing NJ. STAr. ANN.
§ 40A:122.1 (police officers); § 40A:14-9.1 (fire fighters)); see also Booth v.
Township of Winslow, 475 A.2d 644 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 483
A.2d 179 (NJ. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1107 (1985). While a municipality
may not require police and fire department personnel to live within its borders,
a municipality may give preference to its residents in the initial appointment
process. Harrison, 749 F. Supp. at 1330 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-123.1a
(police officers) and § 40A:14-10.1a (fire fighters)). The two statutes establish a
classification system according to residency for police force and fire department
positions. Id. These statutes permit municipalities to determine whether resi-
dency is required on the closing date for the Civil Service examination or on the
actual date of appointment. See also In re Leary, 450 A.2d 504 (N.J. 1982). Thus,
a municipality is able to limit applicants for police and fire department personnel
to residents of the municipality. Harrison, 749 F. Supp. at 1330.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has upheld ordinances that permit munici-
palities to impose residency requirements. See Abrahams v. Civil Service Com-
mission, 319 A.2d 483 (N.J. 1974) (affirming lower court's rejection of challenge
to constitutionality of local residency requirements by finding substantial ra-
tional justifications for ordinances that outweigh adverse impact); Kennedy v.
City of Newark, 148 A.2d 473 (N.J. 1959) (holding that state constitutional op-
position to residency requirement must yield to rational basis for requirement
that furthers public welfare).
82. Harrison, 749 F. Supp. at 1330. Harrison adopted this residency ordi-
nance on October 6, 1981. The ordinance provided in pertinent part:
[A]ll officers and employees of the Town shall, as a condition of
employment, be bona fide residents of the Town....
No person shall be an eligible applicant for any position of employ-
[Vol. 37: p. 409424
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nance, the Residence Act and other state statutes applicable to police
and fire personnel.8 3 The Town staffed uniformed positions through
eligibility lists compiled from the results of a state civil service examina-
tion.8 4 Nonuniformed positions typically were filled through word-of-
mouth or through informal application.8
5
The Town of Harrison had never considered a nonresident for uni-
formed or nonuniformed employment. 86 Furthermore, no black had
ever held a uniformed or nonuniformed municipal position in the
Town. 87 In contrast, blacks represented 22.11% of Harrison's private
work force in 1988.88 The NAACP, through its Newark, New Jersey
ment in the classified civil service of the Town who is not a resident of
the Town....
All non-residents appointed to positions and employments after
the effective date of the Ordinance shall become bona fide residents of
the Town within one year of their appointment....
Failure . . . to maintain residency in the Town shall be cause for
removal or discharge from service.
Harrison, 940 F.2d at 796 (citing Harrison, N.J., Ordinance 747 (October 6,
1981)).
83. Harrison, 749 F. Supp. at 1330. For the pertinent provisions of the Resi-
dence Act and the applicable police and fire department statutes, see supra note
81.
84. Harrison, 749 F. Supp. at 1330. The State Department of Personnel ad-
ministers the civil service examination, which is offered every three years. Id.
The Department, at the Town of Harrison's direction, classified qualified appli-
cants based on their municipal residence and presented to the Town lists of
eligible applicants. Id. These lists contained only residents of the Town of Har-
rison. Id.
The 1988 application forms for police and fire fighter examinations were
introduced as evidence in the district court. Id. These forms specifically stated
in bold print that "[in] all cases, applicants must be residents of the municipality
as of the announced closing date in order to be placed on the resident eligible
list. Those municipalities marked (*) require that [one] also be a resident at the
time [one is] appointed." Id. at 1330-3 1. The district court noted that the Town
of Harrison was marked with an asterisk. Id. at 1331. In this way, applicants for
uniformed municipal employment in Harrison needed to demonstrate residency
both at the closing date for the civil service examination and on the actual date
of appointment. Id. The Town relied entirely on the eligibility lists to fill police
and fire department positions. Id. In fact, when these lists were exhausted, the
Town waited until the Department of Personnel conducted a new examination
and submitted a new list of eligible applicants, all of whom resided in Harrison.
Id.
85. Id. These occupations, predominantly laborer or clerk-typist positions,
were non-competitive and did not require an examination. Id. Typically, ap-
pointees served a probationary period and, upon successful completion, were
formally appointed to the position. Id.
86. Id. The district court determined that Harrison's work force consisted
of 51 police officers, 58 fire fighters and 80 nonuniformed employees. Id. In a
footnote to its opinion, the district court stated that although the evidence con-
tained different employment figures than those listed above, the total number of
employees did not differ substantially from other counts. Id. at 1331 n.3.
87. Id. at 1331. In one instance, the Town's Board of Education hired a
nonresident black woman in a highly-skilled educational capacity. Id. at 1329.
88. Id. at 1331. This percentage was based on private employers in Harri-
17
King: NAACP v. Town of Harrison: Applying Title VII Disparate Impact An
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37: p. 409
branch, filed suit against the Town of Harrison in July 1989, alleging
that the Town had rejected individual NAACP members for municipal
employment because they had not satisfied the Town's residency re-
quirement. 8 9 The NAACP asserted that the enactment of a residency
ordinance, and the Town's adherence to the hiring practices set forth in
the ordinance, effected a disparate impact on blacks in violation of Title
VII.9 0 Following a bench trial, the district court enjoined Harrison from
enforcing its residency ordinance and required the Town to take affirma-
tive steps to attract qualified black applicants in numbers comparable to
son large enough to be required to file an Equal Employment Opportunity
(EEO- 1) report. Id. Black employees comprised 16.1% of the office and clerical
employees of these establishments, 7.6% of the officers and managers, 21.4% of
the craft workers, 34.1% of the operatives, 29.4% of the laborers and 31.8% of
the service workers. Id. Given Harrison's nonexistent black population, virtu-
ally all of these employees must have commuted to Harrison from other munici-
palities. Id. The district court opinion included 1980 Census and 1987 Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission figures for the seven-county region of
Northern New Jersey. Id. at 1331-32. In each county, blacks represented a
greater percentage of the private work force than their representation in the
general population. Id.
89. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 796. The NAACP's initial suit was dismissed by
the district court for lack of standing. NAACP v. Town of Harrison, 907 F.2d
1408, 1410-11 (3d Cir.), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 749 F. Supp.
1327 (D.N.J. 1990), aff'd, 940 F.2d 792 (3d Cir. 1991). The district court also
denied the NAACP's motions for reconsideration and for leave to file an
amended complaint. Id. at 1412.
On appeal, the Third Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of the
complaint for lack of standing, but vacated the orders denying the NAACP's
motions for reconsideration and leave to amend. Id. at 1415. The Third Circuit
concluded that "[w]ithout showing.., a distinct and palpable injury to one of its
members, the NAACP, as an association, cannot achieve standing despite its
long-standing and sincere interest in rectifying such perceived discrimination."
Id. at 1416. The Third Circuit remanded the case to the district court to recon-
sider the NAACP's motion to amend its complaint. Id. at 1417. The Third Cir-
cuit found that the NAACP's proposed amendments were not facially meritless.
Id. Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that it lacked the discretion-
ary power to grant the NAACP leave to amend. Id.
While its appeal was pending, the NAACP filed a second suit asserting the
same claims and requesting the same remedies contained in its original suit.
Harrison, 940 F.2d at 797. After the two complaints were consolidated, the
NAACP filed an amended complaint. Id. The NAACP's amended complaint de-
tailed the experiences of individual NAACP members who had sought police,
fire and clerical positions in the Town. Harrison, 749 F. Supp. at 1335-36. These
individual claims satisfied the standing issue on which the NAACP's earlier com-
plaint had been dismissed. Id.
90. Id. at 1336-37 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988)). The district court
stated:
The challenge here is not to residency requirements per se or to the
State statutes which give a municipality the power to decide whether
applicants be residents of the municipality. The challenge is to Harri-
son's election to use its powers in a manner which excludes black per-
sons from employment.
Id. at 1337.
426
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their availability in the Town's relevant labor market. 9 1
91. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 797. The district court concluded that the NAACP
had established a prima facie case of disparate impact under Title VII. Harrison,
749 F. Supp. at 1341. The district court found a "marked disparity between the
pool of qualified black applicants for municipal jobs in Harrison and the actual
black representation among Harrison's employees." Id. at 1337. The district
court concluded that "this disparity [was] caused, at least in substantial part, by
Harrison's residency requirement." Id.
The NAACP presented statistical evidence from which the district court de-
termined that the Town's relevant labor market contained substantial numbers
of qualified black applicants for municipal employment in Harrison. Id. at 1341.
In the absence of a residency requirement, the district court stated that qualified
blacks would seek municipal employment in Harrison. Id. From this evidence,
the court concluded that Harrison's facially neutral residency requirement ef-
fected a disparate impact on blacks. Id.
The NAACP alleged that Harrison's failure to employ blacks in municipal
positions also supported an inference of purposeful discrimination under the
disparate treatment theory of liability. Id. at 1337 n.5. The district court re-
jected this claim, finding that Harrison's residency requirement had evolved
over many years and did not evince a purposeful intent to discriminate that was
necessary to sustain a claim of disparate treatment. Id.
Returning to its disparate impact analysis, the district court concluded that
the Town did not demonstrate a sufficient business justification to overcome the
effect of the disparate impact caused by its residency requirement. Id. The
Town presented several business justifications to the district court to support its
imposition of a residency requirement. Id. at 1341-42. The Town argued that
protective service personnel, such as police and fire department employees,
should live in the municipality in order to respond promptly to emergencies. Id.
at 1341. The Town also noted that residency in the municipality promoted
knowledge of and loyalty to the community. Id. The Town stressed the financial
costs involved in opening the eligibility lists to nonresidents. Id. Finally, the
Town argued that a residency requirement for nonuniformed positions pro-
moted greater loyalty among employees and decreased tardiness and absentee-
ism. Id.
The district court concluded that these justifications were either overbroad
or insubstantial. Id. at 1342. In rejecting the Town's purported justification that
uniformed employees must live in Harrison in order to respond to an emer-
gency, the district court emphasized that state statutes prevented Harrison from
requiring police and fire personnel to reside in the Town. Id. (citing N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 40A:14-122.1 and § 40A:14-9.1 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992)). The district
court stated that Harrison's residency ordinance and these state statutes enabled
the Town to require applicants for municipal employment to reside within the
Town, but prevented the Town from imposing residency as a condition of em-
ployment. Id. This paradox effectively prevented blacks from gaining municipal
employment, while failing to accomplish the Town's objective that police and
fire personnel reside in the Town. Id.
The district court found that other means could ensure the availability of
off-duty uniformed personnel in times of emergency, including residency based
on a reasonable response time or residency within certain distances from Harri-
son. Id. Such a policy would enable Harrison to attract black applicants from
adjacent areas. Id.
Similarly, the district court held that the Town's claim of increased costs
was insubstantial. Id. The court noted that the greater choice resulting from
more highly-qualified applicants would offset any additional cost to administer
the larger eligibility lists. Id. The district court also dismissed the Town's claims
that its residency requirement promoted increased community involvement. Id.
The court concluded that this claim was not sufficiently substantial to justify the
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A. The State Statutory Scheme
The Third Circuit commenced its analysis by focusing on the New
Jersey state statutory scheme.9 2 The Residence Act enabled New Jersey
municipalities to require residency as a prerequisite to municipal em-
ployment. 93  Although the Residence Act was permissive, not
mandatory, Harrison argued that because a majority of New Jersey mu-
nicipalities had chosen to impose a residency requirement, this collec-
tive action signalled, in effect, a constitutionally sound statewide
policy.9
4
discriminatory effect of the residency requirement. Id. Finally, the district court
dismissed Harrison's residency requirement for nonuniformed employees as
"too nebulous and insubstantial" to justify a discriminatory employment prac-
tice. Id.
In addition to providing injunctive relief and an affirmative remedy, the dis-
trict court's decree further enjoined Harrison from using eligibility lists to fill
vacancies for uniformed positions that were compiled while the residency ordi-
nance was in effect. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 797. The decree directed Harrison to
readvertise, retest and compile new eligibility lists from which to select future
applicants for uniformed positions. Id.
92. Id. at 798. The Third Circuit noted that both of the Town's issues on
appeal centered around the district court's alleged inability to accord proper
weight to the state statutory scheme. Id.
93. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A:9-1 to -10 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992). Previ-
ously, the Harrison work force had been under the purview of the State Civil
Service Act. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 1 A:2-1 to -22 (West Supp. 1992). In 1978,
New Jersey adopted the Act Concerning Residency Requirements for Municipal
and County Employees (the Residence Act). See NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A:9-1 to -
10. For a discussion of the evolution of the pertinent statutory provisions and
the specific language of the Residency Act, see supra notes 79-85 and accompa-
nying text.
94. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 799 & n.4 (citing Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
319 A.2d 483 (N.J. 1974)). In Abrahams, the New Jersey Supreme Court ad-
dressed the state legislature's permissive approach to local residency require-
ments. Abrahams, 319 A.2d at 489. The court stated that sufficient rationaljustifications existed for the policy underlying municipal residency require-
ments. Id. These justifications outweighed the adverse impact on aspiring mu-
nicipal employees. Id. The court concluded:
In short, there are one or more substantial rational justifications for the
policy of such an ordinance sufficient to outweigh such adverse impact
as it may have either upon aspirants to municipal employment or those
already in the municipal employ....
[The] statutory local option in the case of employees ... vests the pol-
icy choice in the municipal legislature, not the courts. Some municipal-
ities . . . have deemed it consonant with local policy to exercise the
option. We hold they may validly do so free of any consitutional
interdiction.
Id.
The Abrahams court noted that advocates of the validity of municipal resi-
dency requirements argue that such requirements promote ethnic balance. Id.
Advocates maintain that residency requirements also enhance employee per-
formance by increasing awareness of city conditions and by promoting greater
personal interest in the city's welfare. Id. These advocates further argue that
absenteeism and tardiness are also reduced, thus ensuring that sufficient, trained
428
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B. The NAACP's Prima Facie Case
Having analyzed the pertinent statutory language, the Third Circuit
addressed the Town of Harrison's challenge that the NAACP had failed
to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact.9 5 Harrison con-
tended that the district court had defined the relevant labor market too
narrowly.9 6 Harrison alleged that this restrictive definition distorted the
validity of the NAACP's statistical data.9 7 Harrison urged the Third Cir-
cuit to adopt a "state-wide multi-employer" relevant labor market.9 8
The Third Circuit rejected this "bottom line" approach, stating that
manpower will be available in emergency situations. Id. Finally, advocates of
these requirements contend that the local expenditure of employees' salaries
benefits the general economy of the municipality. Id.; see also Kennedy v. City of
Newark, 148 A.2d 473, 476 (N.J. 1959) (holding that constitutional issue raised
by residency requirement that serves rational purpose to further public welfare
must yield to legislative power to ordain it); Trainor v. City of Newark, 368 A.2d
381, 384 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (upholding Newark Ordinance despite
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge), cert. denied, 377 A.2d 661
(N.J. 1977); Mercadante v. City of Paterson, 266 A.2d 611, 613 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1970) (reiterating that residential requirements are constitutional), af'd,
275 A.2d 440 (N.J. 1971).
95. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 799-801. The district court defined the NAACP's
burden of establishing a prima facie case. Harrison, 749 F. Supp. at 1337. The
district court required the NAACP to provide statistical evidence demonstrating
a disparity between the relevant labor market of qualified applicants for munici-
pal employment and the actual representation of these applicants in Harrison's
work force. Id. The court also required the NAACP to demonstrate that Harri-
son's residency requirement was responsible for this disparity. Id.
96. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 800. The district court concluded that the rele-
vant labor market for the Town of Harrison consisted of the four-county area of
Hudson, Bergen, Essex and Union Counties. Harrison, 749 F. Supp. at 1338.
The district court based this conclusion on Harrison's geographical location and
the areas from which the Town attracted employees. Id. According to the dis-
trict court, the total civilian labor force in these four counties numbered
1,353,555 persons, of whom 214,747, or 15.9%, were blacks. Id.
In addition, the district court concluded that because of Harrison's geo-
graphic location and the flow of transportation facilities in the area, Harrison,
which is located in Hudson County, could reasonably be viewed as a component
of the City of Newark and a part of Essex County. Id. Finally, the district court
examined evidence showing that 22.1% of Harrison's private labor force was
black. Id. The district court noted that this significant percentage of black work-
ers in the private labor market indicated that blacks were commuting to Harri-
son in order to work in the private sector. Id. The district court stated that the
22.1% figure also suggested that, in the absence of a residency requirement,
blacks would commute to Harrison for municipal employment. Id.
97. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 800. On appeal, the Town did not criticize the
accuracy of the NAACP's statistics. Id. Instead, the Town argued that the state
statutory scheme underlying the Town's residency ordinance necessitated ex-
panding the relevant labor market to include the entire state of New Jersey. Id.
98. Id. Harrison contended that the adoption of residency ordinances by a
majority of municipalities in New Jersey, including the municipalities in Harri-
son's relevant labor market, "create[d] a self-contained refutation of any infer-
ence of racial discrimination, since by definition it cut[] evenly across racial
lines." Id. (citing Brief for Appellant, Harrison (No. 90-5897)).
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the district court's determination of a four-county relevant labor market
was reasonable and not inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.99
The residency requirements of other municipalities, even if statutorily
permitted, were simply irrelevant.10 0 Therefore, the Third Circuit con-
cluded that the NAACP successfully had established a prima facie case of
disparate impact. 101
C. The Town of Harrison's Business Justifications
The Town of Harrison asserted that the district court erred in re-
jecting the business justifications offered to support the Town's resi-
dency ordinance. 10 2 The Town argued that it offered a sufficient
business justification by demonstrating that a rational purpose sup-
ported the adoption of its residency ordinance.' 0 3 This rational pur-
pose, the Town alleged, was embodied in both the passing of the New
Jersey Residence Act and in its enforcement through Harrison's local
ordinance and state statutes pertaining to police and fire personnel.'
0 4
Harrison claimed that this statutory scheme amounted to a statewide
policy that had withstood constitutional attack.' 0 5
99. Id. at 801. The Third Circuit relied on Wards Cove to confirm its rejec-
tion of the "bottom line" approach to Title VII disparate impact analysis. Id.
(citing Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)). The court
based its analysis of the plaintiffs' initial burden on the specific employment
practices of the employer, rather than on the overall effect of the employer's
practices. Id.; see also Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-57.
100. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 801. The Third Circuit rejected Harrison's argu-
ment that its hiring practices should only be judged against other municipal em-
ployers throughout the state. Id. In finding the practices of other employers
irrelevant, the Third Circuit concluded that Harrison had cited no legal prece-
dent, statutory or common law, in support of its theory of a statewide multi-
employer labor market. Id. Therefore, the Third Circuit affirmed that the dis-
trict court's definition of a four-county labor market was "reasonable, well-sup-
ported and in no way inconsistent with the holding of Wards Cove." Id.; see also
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442 (1982) (rejecting "bottom line" ap-
proach to disparate impact analysis and stating that disparate impact theory of
liability focuses on each component of employer's practice). For a discussion of
the "bottom line" approach to Title VII disparate impact analysis, see supra
notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
101. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 801. In affirming the district court's definition of
the relevant labor market, the Third Circuit implicitly recognized that the
NAACP had established a prima facie case of disparate impact. See also Harrison,
749 F. Supp. at 1337 (defining two prongs of plaintiff's prima facie case). The
definition of the relevant labor market was essential to both prongs of the
NAACP's prima facie case. The first prong of the plaintiff's burden, identifying
a statistical disparity, was affirmed by the Third Circuit on appeal. Harrison, 940
F.2d at 801. The second prong, connecting the statistical disparity to Harrison's
residency requirement, was not at issue on appeal. Id. at 798.
102. Id. at 801.
103. Id. (citing reasoned review standard established by Court in Wards
Cove, 490 U.S. at 659). For a discussion of this standard, see supra notes 68-71.
104. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 801.
105. Id. at 801-02; see also Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 319 A.2d 483
430 [Vol. 37: p. 409
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Under the principles established in Wards Cove, Harrison asserted
that it had discharged its burden of production in this business justifica-
tion stage simply by pointing to the NewJersey statutory scheme and the
statewide policy underlying it.106 The Town contended that the district
court had erred in declaring Harrison's proffered business justification
insubstantial without compelling the NAACP to prove that this justifica-
tion was pretextual. 10 7 By failing to shift the burden back to the
NAACP, Harrison charged that the district court violated the teaching of
Wards Cove.' 08 This violation effectively required the Town to prove
that its residency ordinance was compelled by business necessity. 10 9
The Third Circuit determined that Wards Cove did not reduce an
employer's burden of production at the business justification stage to a
showing of mere rationality."I 0 To the contrary, the Town's burden of
production clearly involved more than a mere articulation of possible
rational bases for its residency requirement. I1 The Third Circuit con-
cluded that the Town was required to demonstrate that the challenged
employment practice significantly served its legitimate employment
goals. 112
Having defined the employer's burden of production in a disparate
(N.J. 1974) (holding that residency requirements are based on one or more sub-
stantial rational justifications). For a discussion of Abrahams, see supra note 94.
106. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 802; see also Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659 (rejecting
"business necessity" burden of proof at business justification stage in favor of
whether practice serves "legitimate employment goals" of employer).
107. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 802.
108. Id.
109. Id.; see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (hold-
ing that "touchstone" for employer's burden of justification in Title VII dispa-
rate impact case is business necessity).
110. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 803. The Third Circuit emphasized that while an
employer need not demonstrate the absolute necessity of a challenged employ-
ment practice, it must demonstrate that the practice furthers legitimate business
goals "in a significant way." Id. (citing Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659); see also Mea-
ley, Note, supra note 70, at 419 (urging that courts not defer to employer's busi-
ness justifications but subject them to "reasoned review"). For a discussion of
the effect of Wards Cove on the "business necessity defense" and on the alloca-
tion of burdens in disparate impact cases, see id. at 414-17; see also Mack A.
Player, Is Griggs Dead? Reflecting (Fearfully) on Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1989).
111. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 804. The Third Circuit initially stated that the
case law was unclear as to the "quantum and quality" of evidence required after
Wards Cove. Id. The Third Circuit, however, determined that Harrison retained
the burden to produce "significant evidence that establishes a strong factual
showing of manifest relationship between the challenged practice and the de-
fendant's employment goals." Id.; see also Player, supra note 110, at 32 (contend-
ing that employer's burden met by production of "objective evidence . ..
factually showing a nexus between the selection device and a particular employ-
ment goal"). For a discussion of case law after Wards Cove that addresses Title
VII disparate impact claims, see infra note 141 and accompanying text.
112. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 804 (citing Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659). The
Third Circuit stated that "Harrison was required to present objective evidence
19921 NOTE
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impact claim, the Third Circuit explored the specific business justifica-
tions offered by the Town to support its residency requirement." 13 Af-
ter examining the justifications offered for both uniformed and
nonuniformed employees, the Third Circuit concluded that Harrison
had not presented a sufficient nexus between its residency requirement
and any particular employment goal. 1 14 Therefore, the Third Circuit
affirmed the district court's finding that Harrison had not met its burden
of production with respect to business justification." 15
demonstrating a nexus between its residency ordinance and a particular employ-
ment goal." Id.
113. Id. The rational bases advanced by Harrison in support of its resi-
dency requirement for uniformed personnel included the need for quick re-
sponse to emergency situations, the fostering of loyalty through local officers
who know the community and the increased cost in time and money of opening
the eligibility lists to nonresidents. Id. at 804-05. With regard to nonuniformed
employees, Harrison argued that its residency requirement promoted loyalty
and reduced tardiness and absenteeism. Id. at 805.
114. Id. The district court had rejected Harrison's proximity argument,
claiming that there were alternative means, short of a residency requirement, to
ensure sufficient uniformed personnel in the event of an emergency. Harrison,
749 F. Supp. at 1342. One alternative suggested by the district court would have
imposed a reasonable response time or distance requirement that necessarily
would have included municipalities adjacent to Harrison and would have ena-
bled the Town to attract black applicants from these municipalities. Id. The
district court dismissed Harrison's contention of greater costs as a result of in-
creased applicants for municipal employment. Id. The more improved appli-
cant pool resulting from expanded eligibility lists would have compensated for
any incremental costs incurred. Id. The district court viewed the off-duty pres-
ence of uniformed personnel in the community as a positive factor but con-
cluded that such presence was not "sufficiently substantial to justify the
discriminatory effect of the residency requirement." Id.
Similarly, the district court dismissed the Town's business justifications for
imposing a residency requirement upon nonuniformed personnel, calling these
reasons "too nebulous and insubstantial to justify practices which have had a
significant discriminatory effect, which have prevented the Town from ever em-
ploying a black person." Id.
115. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 805. Having determined that the district court
correctly analyzed the NAACP's disparate impact claim, the Third Circuit ad-
dressed the Town's claim of error in the remedy fashioned by the district court.
Id. at 805. The Third Circuit also considered an alleged due process violation
contained in an amicus curiae brief. Id. at 808. A thorough discussion of these
issues is beyond the scope of this Note. What follows is a brief summary of the
most salient points made by the Third Circuit in disposing of these matters on
appeal. For the Third Circuit's analysis of these issues, see id. at 805-12.
The decree formulated by the district court required the Town of Harrison
to cease enforcing its residency ordinance and to stop requiring municipal resi-
dency as a prerequisite to municipal employment. Id. at 805-06 (citing decree
issued by district court). The decree also required Harrison to take affirmative
measures to recruit and employ qualified black applicants in proportion to their
availability in the relevant labor market. Id.
Harrison challenged the decree, contending that the requirement of affirm-
ative recruitment activities violated Title VII and the Town's equal protection
guarantees. Id. at 806. The Town argued that simply repealing its residency
ordinance was the proper remedy. Id. The Town relied entirely on language in
Wards Cove that required a plaintiff attempting to establish a prima facie case to
24
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IV. ANALYSIS
In Harrison, the Third Circuit commenced its analysis by examining
the state statutory scheme that authorized municipalities to adopt resi-
dency requirements.' 16 This statutory scheme was an appropriate start-
ing point because both issues raised by the Town on appeal originated
from the New Jersey Residence Act, the Town's local residency ordi-
nance and the alleged statewide policy underlying this legislation. 11 7
Harrison urged that the nearly uniform adoption of municipal residency
requirements throughout the state created a statewide multi-employer
labor market that, when viewed in the aggregate, did not discriminate
based on race.' 18
The Third Circuit correctly concluded that Harrison had cited no
legal precedent for its theory of a statewide multi-employer labor mar-
identify the specific employment practice that had caused the disparate impact.
Id. (citing Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656). From this language, the Town con-
cluded that any remedy devised by the district court had to be narrowly tailored
to eliminate only the residency ordinance that the district court had determined
was discriminatory. Id.
The Third Circuit disagreed with this argument, concluding that "the dis-
trict court [did not] err[] in formulating a decree designed to eliminate ... dis-
parity through affirmative recruitment efforts. The remedy fashioned flows
logically from the Title VII violation and in no way transgresses the remedial
authority conferred upon the courts under Title VII." Id. Therefore, the rem-
edy entered by the district court did not violate Title VII or the Town's equal
protection guarantees. Id. at 807.
Finally, the Third Circuit addressed the due process and equal protection
arguments contained in an amicus curiae brief filed by seven residents of the
Town of Harrison. Id. at 808. The amici were applicants for fire department
positions in Harrison whose names were recorded on the eligibility lists Harri-
son maintained for this position. Id. at 809. The amid claim that the district
court's invalidation of this eligibility list without affording those on the list an
opportunity to be heard denied them of a property interest in violation of due
process of law. Id.
The Third Circuit dismissed the amid's claim, stating that the eligibility list
did not represent a constitutionally protected property interest. Id. at 810. The
Third Circuit declared that a new eligibility list, which presumably would include
the amici, was necessary to include those persons omitted from the original list as
a result of the discriminatory residency ordinance. Id. Finally, the Third Circuit
dismissed the amici's equal protection claim as merely a variant of their unsuc-
cessful due process claim. Id. at 812.
116. Id. at 798. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's treatment of the
state statutory scheme, see supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
117. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 798. For a discussion of the pertinent language
of the New Jersey Residence Act, see supra note 81.
118. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 799. The Third Circuit declared that a statewide
multi-employer labor market did not discriminate racially, because by definition
it cut evenly across racial lines. Id. at 800. The district court had determined,
however, that the appropriate labor market for the Town of Harrison consisted
of the four counties of Hudson, Essex, Bergen and Union. Id. at 799. This de-
termination essentially enabled the NAACP to establish a prima facie case of
disparate impact in the district court. Id.; see also Alessandra, Comment, supra
note 5, at 1760 (defining "relevant labor market" as those individuals having
requisite skills for job).
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ket.' '9 Title VII explicitly makes each employer responsible for its own
employment practices. 120 In addition, case law did not support the
Town's position, for the Supreme Court has consistently rejected a
"bottom line" approach to disparate impact analysis.121 The dispositive
issue facing the Third Circuit was whether the Town of Harrison's resi-
dency requirement effected a disparate impact on minority applicants
for municipal employment. 12 2 Absent any statutory authority or case
law supporting the Town's position, the Third Circuit properly deter-
mined that the Town's theory of a statewide multi-employer labor mar-
ket lacked merit. 1
23
In addressing the business justification defense presented by the
Town, the Third Circuit stated that the Town misperceived the nature of
the employer's burden after Wards Cove. 124 Harrison contended that it
had satisfied its burden of production with respect to business justifica-
tion by identifying the state statutory scheme and the statewide policy
supporting this scheme. 125 The district court's characterization of the
Town's justifications as insubstantial, however, effectively compelled the
Town to persuade the Third Circuit that its residency requirement was
justified by business necessity. 126 Harrison asserted that to impose a
burden of proof of business necessity, consisting of the dual burdens of
production and persuasion, violated the teaching of Wards Cove. 12 7
The Third Circuit found that while Wards Cove did not require the
Town to prove that its residency requirement was justified by business
necessity, the Town had to offer more than a mere rational basis for this
requirement. 128 After examining each of Harrison's business justifica-
119. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 800.
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1988). The Third Circuit also stated
that Title VII does not support the view that one employer may discriminate
against employees provided that other employers are willing to hire them. Har-
rison, 940 F.2d at 800.
121. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-57 (1989).
In Wards Cove, the Court stated that "[o]ur disparate-impact cases have always
focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities
for minorities." Id. •
122. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 801. The Third Circuit determined that the col-
lective residency requirements of other New Jersey municipalities were irrele-
vant in attempting to gauge this disparate impact. Id. The court stated that
"[t]he practices of other employers, even when they are undertaken pursuant to
a permissive state statutory scheme, are simply irrelevant." Id.
123. Id. The Third Circuit concluded that the district court's determination
of a four-county relevant labor market for Harrison was "reasonable, well-sup-
ported and in no way inconsistent with the holding of Wards Cove." Id.
124. Id. at 802-03. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of the
Town's business justifications, see supra notes 102-15 and accompanying text.
125. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 802.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 802-03; see also Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
128. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 803. The Third Circuit declared that "1l'ards Cove
clearly places the burden on the employer to produce evidence that 'the chal-
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tions, the Third Circuit concluded that Harrison had not presented suffi-
cient objective evidence to establish a nexus between the challenged
employment practice and a particular employment goal.129 Therefore,
Harrison failed to satisfy the Third Circuit's interpretation of the em-
ployer's burden of production with respect to business justification.13 0
On remand, the Town apparently would have to demonstrate that its
business justification was not insubstantial.13 1 This more onerous bur-
den arguably approaches the Griggs standard of business necessity that
the Supreme Court in Wards Cove expressly rejected. 132
The author submits that the Third Circuit, not the Town of Harri-
son, misperceived the scope of the employer's burden under Wards Cove.
The Third Circuit correctly concluded that Harrison could not merely
assert that its statutory scheme had a rational basis.13 3 Harrison, how-
ever, did more than merely assert that a rational basis supported its resi-
dency requirement; the Town offered specific economic and social
justifications for its practice.' 3 4 These justifications clearly fulfilled the
more relaxed standard established by the Court in Wards Cove.'
3 5
lenged practice serves, in a significant way, the employment goals of the defend-
ant.' " Id. at 804 (citing Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659). The Third Circuit also
stated:
Although Wards Cove arguably diluted the business necessity burden im-
posed upon the defendant under prior case law... it did not reduce the
defendant's burden to a showing of mere rationality. While it is now
clear that the employer need not show that a challenged practice is ab-
solutely necessary, it must demonstrate that the practice furthers legiti-
mate business goals "in a significant way."
Id. at 803 (quoting Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659) (citation omitted).
129. Id. at 804; see also Player, supra note 110, at 32 (asserting that even after
Wards Cove, employer must "present[] objective evidence.., factually showing a
nexus between the selection device and a particular employment goal").
130. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 803-04. Having attempted to prove that its resi-
dency ordinance significantly served its legitimate employment goals, Harrison
argued that Wards Cove required the NAACP to prove that its justifications were a
pretext for discrimination. Id. at 802 (citing Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659). The
Third Circuit, however, intervened and declared that the Town's justifications
were insubstantial. Id. This intervention in the process of shifting evidentiary
burdens violated the teachings of Wards Cove. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660-61
(stating that on remand burden is on respondent Atonio to demonstrate pretex-
tual discrimination).
131. See id. at 659 (concluding that employer need not prove that chal-
lenged practice is essential but may not offer insubstantial justification).
132. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 802; see also Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659 (holding
that "touchstone" is not business necessity standard of Griggs but reasoned re-
view of employer's justification for challenged practice).
133. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 802.
134. Id. at 804-05. These justifications included faster response time in
emergencies, increased community involvement, greater loyalty, reduced tardi-
ness and absenteeism and decreased costs. For a discussion of these justifica-
tions, see supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
135. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659 (declaring "touchstone" of employer's
burden to be reasoned review of challenged practice).
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Therefore, the Third Circuit should have accepted the Town's business
justifications because the Town had met its burden of production ac-
cording to Wards Cove.
The Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove has engendered much
debate over the proper allocation of burdens in a claim of disparate im-
pact.' 3 6 The Wards Cove Court overruled well-established precedent
concerning the shifting of evidentiary burdens at the business justifica-
tion stage of a disparate impact case.13 7 At one extreme is the Griggs
standard, requiring that an employer bear the burden of proving that
the challenged practice is compelled by business necessity. 138 At the
other extreme is the Town of Harrison's interpretation that Wards Cove
required the Town to produce merely a rational basis for the challenged
practice. '3 9
The Third Circuit in Harrison interpreted Wards Cove to permit a
court to intervene in this controversy to reject an employer's profferred
business justifications as insubstantial. 140 In Harrison, the Third Circuit
adopted a results-oriented approach to the question of disparate impact.
Apparently, the court determined that disparate impact had occurred,
yet was faced with unfavorable Supreme Court precedent. The Third
Circuit avoided this predicament by distinguishing Harrison on its facts,
declaring the Town's business justifications insubstantial without requir-
136. See Player, supra note 110, at 1 (asking if precedent established in
Griggs had died and reflecting (fearfully) on the Court's decision in Wards Cove);
Mealey, Note, supra note 70, at 419 (declaring that after Wards Cove, "how courts
should interpret the phrases 'legitimate,' 'in a significant way,' and 'reasoned
review' is unclear"). For a discussion of the Court's decision in Wards Cove, see
supra notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
137. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-59. Specifically, Wards Cove increased the
plaintiff's burden to identify the specific employment practice that allegedly
caused the disparate impact, rather than rely solely on statistical comparisons.
Id. at 656. The decision also eased the burden of the employer in rebutting a
plaintiff's prima facie case. Id. at 659. Instead of the Griggs "touchstone" of
business necessity, the Wards Cove Court held that a challenged practice must
significantly serve the legitimate employment goals of the employer. Id. This
more relaxed standard reduced the employer's burden to one of production and
placed the burden of persuasion upon the plaintiff. Id.
138. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (declaring that
"touchstone" at business justification stage is "business necessity"). For a dis-
cussion of Griggs, see supra notes 39-41 & 50-51 and accompanying text.
139. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 802 (citing Wards Cove for proposition that New
Jersey Residence Act and statewide policy to enforce it satisfied employer's bur-
den of production). For a discussion of the Town's business justifications, see
supra notes 102-15 and accompanying text.
140. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 804-05. Under disparate impact analysis as out-
lined in Wards Cove, if an employer produced a business justification for the chal-
lenged practice, the burden shifted to the plaintiff, not to the court, to prove
pretextual discrimination. For a discussion of the pretext issue, see supra notes
37 & 54 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's inter-
vention in the shifting evidentiary burdens of a disparate impact case, see supra
notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
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ing the Town to prove pretext. Although this tactic permitted the Third
Circuit to achieve its desired result, such an approach violates the teach-
ing of Wards Cove and provides insufficient guidance to future courts ad-
dressing the issue of the proper allocation of burdens at the business
justification stage of a disparate impact case. Other federal courts of
appeals that have addressed this issue apparently have experienced this
same confusion and lack of direction. 14 1
V. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
After extensive negotiations in Congress and between Congress
141. Interestingly, the majority of federal courts of appeals cases
researched by the author cite Wards Cove to support the plaintiff's burden to
identify a specific employment practice when making out a prima facie case,
rather than to support the employer's burden of production at the business jus-
tification stage. This reluctance to cite Wards Cove to support the employer's
business justification burden may reflect a certain discomfort with the soundness
of the Court's holding. See Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 933
F.2d 1140, 1146-47 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding disparate impact employment dis-
crimination in promoting examination and ruling that appropriate remedy was
injunction prohibiting use of rank-order list to fill vacancies); Busby v. City of
Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 777 n.12 (11 th Cir. 1991) (upholding plaintiff's prima
facie case but noting that employer's burden of proof in disparate impact claim
after Wards Cove is one of production, not persuasion); Wooden v. Board of
Educ., 931 F.2d 376, 379 (6th Cir. 1991) (dismissing disparate impact claim for
failure to identify specific employment practice and lack of causal connection
between practice and alleged discrimination); Lopez v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 930 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir. 1991) (dismissing disparate impact claim be-
cause plaintiff did not establish prima facie case by focusing on "bottom line"
racial imbalance in work force); McNairn v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 974, 979 (4th Cir.
1991) (dismissing disparate impact claim for failure to establish under-
representation of protected group and failure to show specific employment prac-
tice caused disparate impact); EEOC v.J.M. Huber Corp., 927 F.2d 1322, 1328-
29 n.24 (5th Cir. 1991) (declaring disparate impact theory requires showing pol-
icy is significantly related to legitimate business purpose such as successful job
performance); Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 926 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1991)
(affirming plaintiff's prima facie case based on identification of specific employ-
ment practice but remanding suit for business justification proceeding under
disparate impact theory); MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766,
771 (1 th Cir. 1991) (relying extensively on Wards Cove in analyzing claim of
disparate impact and granting directed verdict due to insufficient prima facie
case); Gilty v. Village of Oak Park, 919 F.2d 1247, 1254-55 (7th Cir. 1990) (dis-
missing disparate impact claim for failure to identify specific employment prac-
tice at issue and lack of any causal connection between practice and alleged
discrimination); Nash v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville, 905 F.2d 355, 358
(11 th Cir. 1990) (holding that defendant's burden of production not satisfied by
showing that examination was justified on basis that it promoted most qualified
employees), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 967 (1991); Green v. U.S.X., 896 F.2d 801,
805 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that employer's explanation of adverse impact of its
hiring practices on blacks need not be taken at face value by court); Village of
Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1533 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that Wards
Cove curtailed scope of disparate impact liability under Title VII by requiring
employee to identify specific employment practice before challenging statistical
disparity in workforce).
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and the White House, President George Bush signed into law on No-
vember 21, 1991 the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the Civil Rights Act of
1991 or the Act). 14 2
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 on its face expressly overturns Wards
Cove. 14 3 Congress specifically stated in one of its findings that "the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio... has
weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protec-
tions."' 14 4 According to Congress, the Act is intended to "respond to
recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of rele-
142. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. Con-
gress and the White House had disagreed over the proper response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove. See Thomas J. Piskorski & Michael A.
Warner, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Overview and Analysis, 8 THE LABOR LAWYER
9, 11 (1992). In fact, this disagreement had resulted in the nonpassage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1990. Id. Congressional Democrats maintained that Wards
Cove improperly altered the burdens of proof in disparate impact cases estab-
lished by the Court in Griggs. Piskorski & Warner, supra, at 12. This alteration
enabled employers to use employment practices and policies that created an ad-
verse effect on minorities. Id. The White House, on the other hand, argued that
the proposed redefinition of the employer's burden would be so onerous that
employers would be forced to adopt quotas in order to avoid liability. Id.; see also
Gary A. Moore & Michael K. Braswell, "Quotas" and the Codification of the Disparate
Impact Theory: What Did Griggs Really Say and Not Say?, 55 ALBANY L. REv. 459
(1991) (outlining debate and citing Justice White's majority opinion in Wards
Cove as exemplifying respective positions of parties).
The House of Representatives began the 1991 legislative session by passing
a bill that closely mirrored 1990 legislation passed by both the House and the
Senate. Compare H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) with S. 2104, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1990). The Bush Administration quickly countered with an alternative
formulation of the bill. See H.R. 1375, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). In late
October 1991, President Bush announced that the Administration and Senate
leaders had reached an agreement on a compromise bill. See Adam Clymer, Sen-
ators and Bush Reach Agreement on Civil Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1991, at
Al. The compromise bill was promptly passed by Congress. See S. 1745, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Adam Clymer, Senate Passes Civil Rights Bill, 95-5, Ending
a Bitter Debate Over Job Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1991, at A20. President Bush
then signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
143. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 3(2), 105 Stat. at 1071; see also Piskorski &
Warner, supra note 142, at 12 (declaring that Act overturns Wards Cove). But see
C. Ray Gullett, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Did it Really Overturn Wards Cove?,
LABOR L.J., July 1992, at 462, 462 (asserting that Wards Cove decision has not
been reversed by Act; reversal possible only through Supreme Court interpreta-
tion of Act's undefined terms). For a discussion of Wards Cove, see supra notes
55-74 and accompanying text.
144. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 2, 105 Stat. at 1071. Congress found that
(1) additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter un-
lawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace;
(2) the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) has weakened the scope and effective-
ness of Federal civil rights protection; and
(3) legislation is necessary to provide additional protections
against unlawful discrimination in employment.
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vant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to vic-
tims of discrimination."' 14 5 Congress stated its purpose was "to codify
the concepts of 'business necessity' and 'job related' enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. . . . and in the other
Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio." 146
Under the Act, after proving a prima facie case of disparate impact,
a plaintiff may prevail if the employer is unable to demonstrate that the
challenged practice is "job related for the position in question and con-
sistent with business necessity." 14 7 A plaintiff also may prevail if the
employer continues the alleged discriminatory practice and refuses to
adopt an alternative employment practice suggested by the plaintiff. 14 8
The Act also addresses a plaintiffs burden in a disparate impact
case.14 9 The Act requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that each particular
145. Id. § 3, 105 Stat. at 1071. Congress enumerated the following pur-
poses of the Act:
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination
and unlawful harassment in the workplace;
(2) to codify the concepts of "business necessity" and "job re-
lated" enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989);
(3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines
for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. [§§] 2000e [to 2000e-17]); and
(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by ex-
panding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide
adequate protection to victims of discrimination.
Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. § 105(a), 105 Stat. at 1074. The Act provides that if an employer
demonstrates that the particular employment practice at issue does not cause
the alleged disparate impact, the employer need not demonstrate that the chal-
lenged practice is consistent with business necessity. Id.
Under Wards Cove, an employer bears the burden of producing a business
justification for the challenged employment practice. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at
659. This justification may not be insignificant, but it need not be essential or
indispensable to the employer's business. Id. For a discussion of Wards Cove, see
supra notes 55-74 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Wards Cove
Court's analysis of the nature of the employer's burden in a disparate impact
case, see supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
Under Griggs, an employer bears the burden of proof (production and per-
suasion) at the business justification stage of a disparate impact claim. See Griggs,
401 U.S. at 431. This burden requires that the employer's practice be com-
pelled by the "touchstone" of business necessity. Id. For a discussion of Griggs,
see supra notes 39-41 & 50-51 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
Wards Cove Court's distinction between the burdens of production and persua-
sion in a disparate impact claim, see supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
148. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105(a), 105 Stat. at 1074. For a discussion
of the Wards Cove Court's handling of the pretext issue, see supra note 74 and
accompanying text.
149. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105(a), 105 Stat. at 1074.
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challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact. 150 If a
plaintiff demonstrates that an employer's decisionmaking process is not
capable of separation for analysis, this process may be analyzed as one
employment practice. 151
These provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 are designed to
reverse the holding in Wards Cove that an employer need only produce a
business justification for a challenged employment practice, and that the
burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff at all times. 1 52 The Act
also overturns the holding in Wards Cove that the "dispositive issue" in a
disparate impact claim is whether the challenged practice "serves, in a
significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer," and
requires that the challenged practice be "consistent with business
necessity." 153
Critics of the Act state that although the Act does indeed alter em-
ployment discrimination law, in many respects the Wards Cove decision
remains "largely untouched."' 54 For example, although the Act uses
the terms "job related" and "business necessity," neither term is specifi-
cally defined.155 Protracted bargaining sessions between Congress and
150. Id.
151. Id. In Wards Cove, the Supreme Court cited Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust to reaffirm that a plaintiff must identify the specific employment practices
that are responsible for any alleged statistical disparities. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at
656 (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988)). For
a discussion of the plaintiffs burden in Wards Cove and Watson, see supra notes
65-67 and accompanying text.
152. See Piskorski and Warner, supra note 142, at 12. For a discussion of the
Court's allocation of the burdens in Wards Cove, see supra notes 72-73 and ac-
companying text.
153. See Piskorski & Warner, supra note 142, at 12. For a discussion of this
holding by the Wards Cove Court, see supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
154. See Gullett, supra note 143, at 462. Professor Gullett states that "Wards
Cove [Packing Co.] v. Atonio appears to be alive and well despite the sound and
fury regarding its demise." Id.
155. See Gullett, supra note 143, at 464; see also Civil Rights Act of 1991
§ 104, 105 Stat. at 1074 (amending "Definitions" section of Civil Rights Act of
1964 but not providing definitions of "job related" or "business necessity").
The legislative history of the Act does not offer any insight into the meaning
of these terms. The Act states that this history is confined to an interpretive
memorandum introduced by Senator Danforth that appears in the Congres-
sional Record. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105(b), 105 Stat. at 1075. The Act
provides that "[n]o statements other than the interpretative memorandum ap-
pearing [in the Congressional Record] shall be considered legislative history of,
or relied upon in any way as legislative history in construing or applying, any
provision of this Act that relates to Wards Cove." Id. The interpretive memo-
randum states:
The terms "business necessity" and "job related" are intended to
reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in other Supreme Court decisions
prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
See 137 Cong. Rec. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991). Commentators have con-
cluded that the interpretive memorandum "adds nothing and simply reiterates
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the Bush Administration over the meaning of "business necessity" re-
sulted in final legislation for which both sides could and did claim vic-
tory.15 6 In the words of one commentator: "Guidance concerning the
level of proof required of an employer to successfully defend itself
against a prima facie charge of disparate impact remains hazy and will
ultimately be decided again by the Supreme Court."' 157 Furthermore,
the Act's clarification that the burden of persuasion shifts to the em-
ployer once the plaintiff has demonstrated a prima facie case may not
provide the plaintiff with a significant advantage.' 58
Despite the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, courts still
face the task of defining the meaning of the term "business necessity."
Given the Supreme Court's current interpretation of "business neces-
sity" in Wards Cove, the Act ultimately may have little or no effect on the
Court's consideration of disparate impact claims. This potential out-
come may cause more courts to follow the lead of the Third Circuit in
Harrison in rejecting what is perceived as unfavorable Supreme Court
precedent by distinguishing undefined terms or manipulating the alloca-
tion of burdens in a disparate impact case. The resultant confusion and
inconsistency in the courts will not benefit plaintiffs or employers seek-
ing resolution of disparate impact claims.
James C. King
one of the stated purposes of the Act." Moore & Braswell, supra note 142, at
478.
156. See 137 CONG. REC. S15,472 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of
Sen. Dole); 137 CONG. REC. S15,233 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy); see also Gullett, supra note 143, at 464-65 (noting that Administration
claimed Act upheld Wards Cove interpretation of business necessity but Con-
gressmen Kennedy and Danforth disagreed); Moore & Braswell, supra note 142,
at 476-77 (declaring that Act's failure to define "business necessity" left conflict
between House and Administration bills unresolved and enabled both sides to
claim victory).
157. Gullett, supra note 143, at 464.
158. See Gullett, supra note 143, at 464 (contending that "[o]nly when the
evidence that both parties present is 'in equipose' does this burden result in a
finding for plaintiff that would otherwise not be reached").
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